SOME OLD IRISH words have two distinct semantic ranges. On the one hand they have a range of meanings not determined by Latin; on the other, when Latin influence is clearly present, typically in a learned register, they can be used in quite different senses. Such words pose four problems: first, the native and Latinate usages have to be clearly distinguished; secondly, the source or sources of Latin influence must be identified; thirdly, it has to be decided whether the Latinate usage is peculiar to a particular writer or to a particular subject area (for example exegesis) or is generally accepted among writers of Irish in all areas subject to Latin influence; finally, the links between the native and Latinate usages need to be clarified. I shall attempt to answer these questions for one word, *dliged*, whose semantic development has never been fully explained. Although the entry in *DIL* made the important step of acknowledging the relationship between the senses of *dliged* and those of certain Latin words, such as *dictum* and *ratio*, it did not identify clearly enough the initial native senses of the word, nor was it able to explain what native usages were the starting-points for the extended career which *dliged* came to enjoy in the frontier-zone between Latin and Old Irish. In other words, it did not identify those native uses of *dliged* which were capable of suggesting that it should be the standard Irish term for Latin *ratio* and dictum (*sententia*).

In Old Irish there appear to be no examples of *dliged* in such characteristic verbal noun constructions as *ebert dó domine and*, ‘that he should say domine there’ (Ml. 35 c 27). It is, therefore, a nominal derivative rather than a verbal noun. Yet the semantic links between the verb *dligid* and the noun *dliged* are evident. The meaning of *dliged* in such early sources as the laws is usually closely tied to the syntax of the active verb *dligid*, namely to *dligim ní duit*, ‘I am entitled to something from you’, rather than to the passive *dlegair ní duit* ‘you owe something’. In other words, *dliged* normally means ‘entitlement’ or ‘right’.

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2*Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus*, ed. W. Stokes and J. Strachan, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1903–5; repr. Dublin 1975) i. 86; the abbreviations Ml., Wb. and Sg. are used for the main collections of glosses in the *Thesaurus* (hereafter *Thes.*), namely the Milan, Würzburg and St Gall glosses.


rather than ‘obligation’. It may, however, be used both for the right itself (a relationship between a person and a thing or an action) and for the action or thing to which a person has a right. Examples of both are given at the end of this paper.

A problematic example is Wb. 9 d 24:

(1) Nolite fr[a]udare inuiicem . . . né temptet uos Satanas propter incontinentiam uestram .i. arna dich cách assadligud inadaltras trilathar demuin et tribarnebcongabthetitsi.

In *Thes.* this is translated ‘lest everyone go out of his duty into adultery through the Devil’s influence and through your incontinence’. It is more likely, however, that *dliged* here means ‘rightful state’, that is, the state in which someone is entitled to be. First, it may be noted that in Wb. 3 c 7 *afer dligid* glosses *uiuente uiro* ‘while her husband is alive’; in the next gloss, 3 c 8, *dofur indligid* glosses *cum alio uiro*. In these examples *dligid* (*indligid*) is the genitive singular of *dliged* used adjectively. In Wb. 3 c 7 the meaning is probably literally ‘her man of entitlement’, namely ‘the man with whom she is entitled to have sexual relations’. Secondly, in Wb. 9 d 20 (shortly before the problematic gloss, 9 d 24) there is a gloss in both Latin and Irish on St Paul’s *Nolite fraudare inuicem*, which begins in Irish, *na tiubrad cách a chéle*, ‘let not each defraud the other’, and continues in Latin, .i. *a ratione coniugii*, where the Latin *ratio* is equivalent to Irish *dliged*, ‘namely of the entitlement of marriage’. In the context, therefore, *assa dligud* in Wb. 9 d 24 is likely to mean, not ‘out of his duty’ as it is translated in *Thes.*, but ‘out of the state to which he is entitled’.

The primary senses of *dliged* (‘entitlement, right; that to which one has a right’) were not, on their own, a sufficient basis for the much more varied range of meaning which the word acquired through the influence of Latin. What was most influential was the need to find Irish equivalents to some central Latin concepts. The most helpful way to approach the history of the word is, first, to survey briefly the senses of *dliged* in the glosses, dividing the latter into three subject-areas: (i) exegesis, (ii) arithmetic and the paschal computus, (iii) grammar. Once this task has been completed, one can then go on to attempt an explanation of the ways in which the range of meaning in the glosses may have developed from the original native usage. This is necessary, partly because the treatment in *DIL* relies too heavily on questionable translations in the *Thesaurus*. Although *DIL* does have the merit of recognizing the major role played by the Latin word *ratio* in the semantic development of

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5 An exception is Wb. 6 a 23, where *dligetha* renders *debita* and the next gloss (on *Nemini quicquam debeatis*) runs .i. *nídlegar ní dúib* and continues in Latin .i. *deponite debita omnia ut liberi sitis caritati*; on this gloss see also Bergin, ‘Old Irish *dligid’*, 187.

6 This example and the equivalence between *dliged* and *ratio* are discussed further below (no. 15).
dleliged, it gives a false priority to the usage of the glosses and sometimes fails to set its examples of dliged in their syntactic contexts.

I. EXEGESIS

In the Milan glosses, dliged dances to two principal tunes, both Latin. On the one hand, it corresponds to intellectus, sententia or dictum; and on the other, its Latin counterpart is ratio. The three terms, intellectus, sententia, and dictum are linked together by the varied senses of sententia, ranging from ‘sentence’ (a unit of text) to ‘statement’ (a linguistic act) to ‘judgement’ (a mental act) and to ‘meaning’ conceived as the mental act corresponding to a linguistic act (I am not talking philosophically here, merely about the way in which the early Irish terminology seems to portray these matters). I shall give one example each of sententia and intellectus, and two of ratio:

(2) dliged as sententia, Ml. 77 b 11:

\[
\text{iteratur autem sententia .i. duber fudí a ndligedsa isindsalm .i.}
\]

\[
\text{conuertantur ad uesperum.}
\]

The sententia ‘conuertantur ad uesperum’ occurs in Psalm 58:7 and again in Psalm 58:15. The occasion of this gloss is the second occurrence. The translation is thus: ‘i.e. he gives this sentence twice in the psalm’.

(3) dliged as equivalent to intellectus, Ml. 14 d 5:

\[
\text{omne intellectum ad summam (gl. ad numerum) redigentes . . . .i. adrimfem 7 doaidlibem cech n-oín dliged fil in psalmis. ‘i.e. we}
\]

\[
\text{shall enumerate (following the Latin gloss ad numerum) and we}
\]

\[
\text{shall deal with (redigentes) every meaning (cech n-oín dliged = omne intellectum) which is in the Psalms.’}
\]

(4) dliged as ratio, Ml. 54 a 4, 5:

\[
\text{non necessitate deiectos . . . sed ratione patientes\textsuperscript{4} et obidientes\textsuperscript{5} semplices.}
\]

4. .i. ho thuil a menman 7 is dliged leu tabart inna fochaide foraib.

5. .i. ar denam tuile de ho menmain 7 huare as dliged leu inna fochaide do thabairt foraib tar æsi a pectha.

The glossator was construing ratione both with patientes and with obidientes. In 54 a 4 the glossator has two approaches to ratione: on the one hand, it is ho thuil a menman ‘in accordance with the desire of their minds’ that they endure their sufferings; on the other, the bringing of their sufferings upon them is, in their opinion, a dliged. The Thesaurus translates dliged here as ‘law’; however, the meaning is ‘reason’, as the contrast with necessitate deiectos shows. They do not suffer in accordance with an iron law of necessity — of fate — but rather there is a reason behind their troubles. What the reason may be is shown in the next gloss: ‘for doing the will of God from the mind (intentionally) and
because they consider it to be reasonable that their sufferings should be inflicted upon them for their sin’.

A somewhat similar contrast underlies Ml. 19 d 5:

(5) omnia ut fors tulerit aguntur incerta, .i. tocad .i. conabad dliged remdeicsen oco tuistin sidi acht inti diib bed tressa dofordsuclaim alaii.

The translations ‘i.e. fate, i.e. that it should not be a law of providence at their creation, but whoever is stonger should devour the other’.

Ml. 19 d 5 is part of a series of glosses, mostly on Psalm 4, in which the phrase dliged remdeicsen is used. Thes. translates dliged in all these examples by ‘law’. The first example, Ml. 19 d 1, suggests that this cannot be right: dliged is there used to gloss ratio in the phrase dispensationem rationis. Similarly, in Ml. 19 d 2, where the context is the role of providence in distinguishing the good from the bad by means of censura iustitiae, ‘just judgement’, the gloss has dliged remdeicsen. In Ml. 19 d 5, therefore, the contrast is between mere chance, fors or tocad, and a discriminating providence, variously termed dispensatio rationis, censura iustitiae and discretio in the Latin text. ‘Law’, therefore, is not an adequate translation. Ml. 19 d 5 should be translated: ‘i.e. fate, i.e. that there should be no providential thought (ratio) at their creation’.

II. ARITHMETIC AND THE PASchal COMPUTUS

In this area dliged renders ratio in the sense of ‘calculation’. In a strict computistical context, the only examples I have are in the note on the saltus lunae in the Karlsruhe MS of Bede’s De Rerum Natura and De Temporum Ratione and in the Vatican computus. The same usage, however, is exemplified in Ml. 111 c 17 and Sg. 181 a 8. The former is worth citing for it refers more generally to arithmetical calculation:

(6) et ita clara certaque sit dexteræ tuæ difensio quam indubitata ratio numerorum rerumque cognitio.

17. .i. amal as ndliged fir bís i n-arim do neuch atarimi rl. ‘i.e. as it is a true calculation which is in counting for the one who counts them’.

III. GRAMMAR

In general the Thesaurus translates dliged in the St Gall glosses by ‘law’ or ‘rule’; Hofman generally prefers the latter. Often this fits the context tolerably well, but it can be shown to be oversimplified.

7 The others are Ml. 19 d 1, 19 d 10, 19 d 17, 20 b 10, 20 c 5, 27 d 10.
8 In Ml. 19 d 10, ni didligud remdeicsen glosses aliquid discretionis.
9 Thes. ii 10; also ed. R. Thurneysen, Old Irish Reader (Dublin 1949, repr. 1980) 32; Thes. ii. 40 (2 b 25).
(7) *dliged as ratio* ‘reason’:
Sg. 61 a 9: Dubia autem sunt genera, quae nulla ratione cogente auctoritas ueterum diuero genere protulit, ut ‘hic finis’ et ‘haec finis’.
.i. is inderb im mascu fá femen ní coméicnigedar na dliged insin uel uno genere uel diuero genere.

The *Thesaurus* translates ‘tis uncertain whether it be a masculine or a feminine: there is not any rule that obliges that’; Hofman similarly has ‘rule’. But *ní coméicnigedar na dliged insin* merely renders ‘nulla ratione cogente’, ‘for no compelling reason’, and the translation of the second sentence in the gloss should therefore run: ‘no reason compels that’.

(8) *dliged as ratio* ‘pattern’, ‘nature’:
Sg. 220 a 5: quando uero uerbis coniunguntur et intransitiuae sunt et generalem seruant accentuum rationem, inter aduerbia numerant. i iar riagol chenelaig aicend i ndobriathraib amal as ndliged aicend i ndobriathraib olichene.

This example shows how close *dliged* ‘ratio’ can come to meaning ‘law’ (as it is translated in the *Thesaurus*): *generalis ratio* is translated both by *ríagol chenélach* and by *dliged ... olichene*. Yet the glossator is not simply repeating himself, since he wants to say that these words (e.g. *ultra*) follow in these circumstances (*quando ...*) the general rule of accents for adverbs. The last part may thus be translated ‘in accordance with the nature (ratio) of accents on adverbs in general’. The *dliged*, the *ratio*, is the way accents on adverbs function; it is not so narrow as a specific rule, *ríagol*.

*Dliged*, in the St Gall glosses, often corresponds to *ratio* in the sense of ‘phonological or grammatical process’: for example the *ratio analogiae* (*Thes. ii. 185.8*) is one of the two *dligeda* of Sg. 178 a 3, the other being *recta proportio* (*Thes. ii. 174.15; cf. 16–17)*. Indeed, once the varied senses of *ratio* have been taken into account it can be said that in very many of the examples of *dliged* among the St Gall glosses the Latin counterpart was *ratio*.

There are, however, some examples in which *dliged* is probably not equivalent to *ratio*:

(9) *Dliged as regula* in the St Gall glosses: Sg. 21 b 14: *conforcmat dliged innandiuite inmenicc*, gl. Est tamen quando in compositiis etiam subtrahit consonans, ut ‘coeo, cois’.

The reference is to Herodian’s doctrine that in compounds the *regula* applying to simple forms should be applied (*Thes. ii. 70.19–21*). The

11Similarly, in Sg. 206 a 2 *dliged* corresponds to the *ratio* of *Thes. ii. 203.20*; the *ratio* is the process by which one makes the neuter end in *-um* when the masculine ends in *-us*. 
translation therefore is: ‘so that they often preserve the rule of the simple forms’.

(10) Sg. 193 b 6: *frisgair intestemin se dondib dligedaib remeperthib*,
gl. saepe et praesenti pro praeterito et praeterito pro praesenti utuntur auctores necessitatis causa, cum deficient et in ‘or’ desinentia praesenti et in o terminantia praeterito.

Here the translation appears to be: ‘This text answers to the two rules aforesaid’. The gloss may be compared with Sg. 193 b 4, where *iure praedicto* in the gloss similarly refers back to a grammatical rule.\(^{12}\)

This use of *ius* for a grammatical rule may itself be a calque on *dliged*; Priscian’s normal term is *regula*, and this usually corresponds to its Irish loan *riagol*.\(^{13}\)

There is a clear contrast, then, between the usage of grammar and the computus, on the one hand, and that of exegesis on the other. In grammar *dliged* has two Latin counterparts, *ratio* and *regula* (*ius*), and remarkably little evidence for any other; in the computus *dliged* seems only to render *ratio*. In exegesis it has three equivalents: *ratio*, *sententia* (*dictum*) and *intellectus*; and examples of *dliged* as *sententia* etc. are about as common as examples of *dliged* as *ratio*. Of the three, two are also found in the Würzburg glosses, namely *ratio* and *sententia* (*dictum*).\(^{14}\)

The best approach to an explanation of the strikingly different ranges of meaning is to begin with *dliged* as the counterpart to *ratio*. *Ratio* itself has a peculiarly wide range of meanings, many of which are remote from any sense which *dliged* had before it underwent Latin influence; yet most are exemplified in the examples of *dliged* in the glosses. One must therefore conclude that it early became accepted among Irish ecclesiastical scholars that *dliged* was to be the translation of *ratio*, whether or not the relevant sense of *ratio* had any resemblance to a normal sense of *dliged*. The acceptance of this equation between *dliged* and *ratio* is common to all the major collections of glosses; it is also common to the subject areas of exegesis, grammar, arithmetic and the paschal computus. By the mid eighth century (the approximate date of the Würzburg glosses), therefore, the equation was already fully established.

A likely basis in native usage for this equation is provided by phrases of the type found in *Crith Gablach*, lines 11–12:\(^{15}\)

\(^{12}\)For *ius* as grammatical rule, cf. Sg. 212 b 6; for the connection between *ratio* and *ius* cf. Sg. 163 b 2: *Aliam quoque quidam rationem de hoc conati sunt reddere, i.e. iure i.e. buithe cen forngarthid dondí as uolo*. ‘Some have attempted to give another explanation for this, i.e. rule, i.e. of there being no imperative for the word *uolo*’.

\(^{13}\)With *riagol* in e.g. Sg. 32 a 2 cf. *Thes.* ii. 84.11, *contra regulam*.

\(^{14}\)Ratio: Wb. 5 d 8, 24 b 21; *sententia, dictum*: 13 a 29, 23 c 11.

\(^{15}\)*Crith Gablach*, ed. D. A. Binchy (Dublin 1941, repr. 1979) § 3.
(11) Mad a dligiud fénechais . . . ‘If it be in accordance with the dliged of native Irish law . . .’ contrasted with lines 6–7, A aurlunn grád n-ecalsa, ‘According to the model of the grades of the Church’.

Similar phrases in which dliged is governed by a preposition and is followed by a characterization of some institution, law or quality considered as having claims upon persons are:

(12) a dligiud altrama ‘from the requirement of fosterage’ (Críth Gablach, line 31).

(13) iar ndligiud hirisse (Wb. 5 d 8) translating secundum rationem fidei

This usage is derived from the use of the active verb dligid with a non-personal subject, as in the following heptad:

(14) [A]taid secht n-aithne la Féiniu na dlegat a taisic . . .

‘There are seven deposits in Irish law which do not require to be restored . . .’

On the other hand, the native senses of dliged also influenced the use of Hiberno-Latin ratio. In Wb. 9 d 20, St Paul’s injunction to married couples not to refuse sexual intercourse (Noli fraudare inuicem: I Cor. 7: 5) is rendered

(15) .i. na tiubrad cách a chéle .i. ex ratione coniugii i.e. let not anyone cheat his spouse, i.e. of the entitlement of marriage.

Here the Latin gloss probably renders an Irish a dligiud lánamnaso: the spouses are not to cheat one another of their rights. A clear parallel is provided by the Hibernensis: the heading to Bk. xxxi. 18, De ratione primogeniti a fratribus suis, means, as the contents of the chapter demonstrate, ‘About the right(s) of a first-born son as against his brothers’. It corresponds exactly to such headings as: De iure sacerdotis a populo (ii. 11), De iure principis a populo (xxxvii. 9); similarly xlvi, De ratione matrimonii illustrates a sense of ratio (the ‘rightful order’ which

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16 Cf. CIH 587.21–4: Ceist, in forcongarar turachreic molta no aire? mad iar nldligid na treibhe deodha, ni forcongair acht molad de nama, γ is nem a log. mad iar nldligid na treibhi domanda immurgu, forcongarar, ut salmon: quomodo conprobator argendum in conflutona γ in fornace aurum, sic homo ora laudantis. (Prov. 27:21)

17 CIH 19.3 (cf. 15.25; 20.13; 44.29, otha soduin dligi cach oin a taisic cinni nasair = 1994.1–2, ar otha sin dligid gac .o. a taisic gini ronasar, = 2247.23–4, ar otha sin dligid cach .o. a taisic ceni ronasar).

18 Die irische Kanonensammlung, ed. H. Wasserchleben, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1885) 110; other examples are xxxii. 23b, xxxiiii. 9, xxxvi. 7a. For a probable Welsh-Latin example, see Lifris, Vita S. Cadoci, c. 37 (ed. Wade-Evans, Vitae Sancorum Britanniae et Genealogiae, p. 104): ‘Abbas uero super aram illud ponat, et iudicent secundum ueram sinodi rationem et seriem iudicialis libri mei, quem ego scripsi.’ Wade-Evans’s translation of secundum ueram sinodi rationem is ‘according to the true finding of a synod’; but ‘finding’ is unlikely to be the meaning of ratio.
an institution requires) which is comparable both with (12) above and with such titles as *Di dligiud raith 7 somaine la flaith* (CIH 432.21).

The type of phrase, preposition + *dliged* + subjective genitive, is, therefore, common to the vernacular legal texts of the seventh and eighth centuries and also to the later glosses on Latin texts. Furthermore, it is a syntactical pattern in which *ratio* itself could appear both in its own right and as a stand-in for Irish *dliged*. *Críth Gablach’s a ddligiud fénechais* could readily be translated by *ex ratione* or *secundum rationem legis Hiberniae*. From this starting-point it would have been easy to progress to those common uses of *ratio* and *dliged* to introduce reasons or explanations: *dliged* can gloss *ob hoc* ..., or *racione* ... ‘by reason of’.\textsuperscript{19} This then was a likely basis for the convergence of *dliged* and *ratio*, but that is not to deny that the full equation was a step which went much further. It can only be explained as part of a deliberate attempt to create in Irish a properly developed vocabulary for the discussion of thought and language, an instance of successful linguistic legislation.

In the grammatical glosses there is another use of *ratio* and *dliged* which is relatively easy to explain on the basis of native usage. The grammatical theory expounded by Priscian treated paradigms as morphological processes by which the different cases or conjugational forms were derived from a headword (the nominative singular or the first-person present indicative), for example *facio* → *feci*, *urbs* → *urbem*.\textsuperscript{20} A process of this kind was described as a *ratio* and as a *dliged*.\textsuperscript{21} In this instance, the relationship between headword and derived form may have been perceived as similar to entailment. Just as a deposit would normally require (*dlligid*) to be restored to the owner, so a head-word might require or entail (*dlligid*) a particular paradigmatic form in a given syntactical context. Yet this explanation of *dliged* as *ratio* ‘grammatical process’ is not essential. The important thing, again, is that once the general equivalence of *ratio* and *dliged* had been agreed, on the initial basis only of certain senses of both words, all other senses of *ratio* became capable of being rendered by *dliged* in Irish. *Dliged* as ‘grammatical process’ may well belong to the initial basis on which the equivalence between *dliged* and *ratio* was constructed, but the discussion needs to be taken further before this issue can be decided.

It is less easy to explain *dliged* as the counterpart of *sententia* and *dictum*. A usage attested in the vernacular laws again provides a possible starting-point:

\textsuperscript{19}Sg. 71 a 6, 75 a 1.

\textsuperscript{20}On this see P. H. Matthews, *Inflectional morphology: a theoretical study based on aspects of Latin verb conjugation* (Cambridge 1972) 10–11, etc.

\textsuperscript{21}Sg. 113 b 3. A capite solum composita\textsuperscript{a} ablata s et mutata e in i, et addita ‘itis’ faciunt genetiuum, ut ... biceps bicipitis, ... *isindib nammá atá andliged cruthaigtheo gentensa*. *Thes.* translates ‘i.e. ‘itis in them only is this norm of forming a genitive’, but the meaning is rather ‘only in them is there this method of forming the genitive’. 

(16) Ar ata i ndlige (l. i ndligiud) na Feine buachaill oc cach cethraí fri
de. Is de ata 'cond bo buachaill i mbansoilsi'. CIH 72.10–11.
For it is part of the dliged of the Irish that a herdsman be with
all livestock by day. For that reason there is [the saying], ‘A
herdsman is the good sense of a cow in the daylight’.

The easy and adequate translation of i ndligiud here is ‘in the law’; but i 
ndligiud inna Féne cannot be separated from such phrases as i ndligiud 
flatha ‘among the rights of lordship’ (Cáin Lánanna, ed. Thurneysen,
§ 1). The lawyer is saying that the community, the Irish, have a right,
dliged, that livestock be herded by day. This right is expressed by a
traditional saying, cond bó búachaill i mbansoillsi. The dliged may 
thus be expressed as a sententia.

A second step is to look at another usage found in the Glosses, by
which a contrast is made between dliged, on the one hand, and toimtiu
‘opinion’, and still more ‘error’ on the other. Example (17) depends
upon an emendation proposed by Plummer.22 Mi. 56 b 16 reads:

(17) ad huiusmodi depellendum errorem iste psalmus componitur do-
chloud tra indligid sin rogabad insalms

which the Thesaurus, taking indligid as in dligid, translates: ‘now
to overthrow that view this psalm was sung’.

But a view or opinion, especially one that is rejected, is toimtiu in the
glosses, not dliged.23 Plummer’s emendation to ind indligid sin is easy
and almost certainly correct: indliged then translates error. One may
compare Sg. 22 b 12 where Priscian is discussing whether the final b
of preverbal prepositions, such as ab or sub, should be assimilated to a
following consonant: on ‘f quoque sequente rationabilius : affectus . . . ’
the glossator writes .i. is dligthigiu a cumscugud quam a feidligud, ‘i.e.
it is more reasonable to change it [the b] than to keep it’. Priscian goes
on to remark, ‘Errore tamen scriptorum hoc fieri puto quam ratione’.
In this context a ratio is a well-grounded procedure or view which can
be directly contrasted with error. The use of dliged to distinguish right
from wrong, true from false, is, however, well attested in several areas of
Old Irish, notably in the adjectival use of the genitive singular dligid and,
in the early period, in the adverbial use of the dative singular dligud.24
It is not surprising, therefore, if the use of dliged in the Milan glosses to
render sententia and dictum should be confined to scriptural sentences
or sayings; these were by definition correct, dligtech.25

The case of dliged as intellectus ‘meaning’ is perhaps similar in
part to dliged ‘(correct) statement’, and also in part to the use of dliged

22 In his copy of Thes. (now in the Celtic library of Jesus College, Oxford).
23 Mi. 61 d 2.
24 Examples are given below.
25 The equivalence between dliged and ratio extended to the adjectives dligtech and
rationabilis, e.g. Wb. 5 c 20.
for grammatical processes. In Sg. 73 b 6 the glossator was confronted by Priscian’s argument that to explain magnanimitas as a compound of magnus and animitas is vacuous, since animitas does not occur except in the compound magnanimitas. Priscian argues as follows: ‘For if I say “magnanimitas is a compound of magnus and animitas”, I say nothing, for animitas is not used on its own.’ On nihil dico, ‘I say nothing’, the glossator writes:

(18) ní epur ní sin .i. ni dliged, Sg. 73 b 6. ‘I say nothing in that, i.e. it is not dliged’

The Thesaurus translates the second clause by ‘it is not a law’, but this is unlikely to be correct. It is more probable that the glossator is saying ‘it is not an explanation’. If so, dliged renders ratio, but in a context in which to say ‘it is not an explanation’ and ‘it does not make sense’ are very close. 26 Hence this provides a bridge from dliged = ratio to dliged = intellectus.

An intermediate example is Ml. 18 c 11. The issue is the titulus of Psalm 3: ‘Psalmus Dauid, cum fugeret a facie Absalom, filii sui’. The commentator writes as follows:

Psalmus hic proprium . . . habet titulum et quidem uel inscriptione {tituli} eum super alia praenotare . . . .

On super alia the glossator writes:

(19) .i. sech alaili dliged 7 indliucht .i. niconfil nach n-intliucht n-aile and acht a n-ad-fiadar isin titul.

This the Thesaurus translates: ‘i.e. apart from other sayings and meanings, i.e. there is no other meaning there than what is set forth in the superscription.’ The translation is acceptable; but, since elsewhere dliged renders intellectus as well as sententia and dictum, it is possible that dliged and indliucht here are closer than ‘saying’ and ‘meaning’. A possible translation for dliged in this gloss is ‘implication’, so that the first clause would run, ‘i.e. apart from other implications and meanings’. ‘Implication’ is close to ‘requirement’ and would explain why cech n-oindliged could render omnem intellectum in Ml. 14 d 5.

The first and most obvious implication of this investigation is the interpenetration of Latin and Irish intellectual vocabulary. Admittedly Latin was on the whole the dominant partner in this process, yet there are clear cases in which dliged has influenced ratio rather than the other way round. The way in which dliged is calqued on ratio and yet elsewhere ratio is calqued on dliged demonstrates a thorough-going bilingualism in the conceptual processes of early Irish scholars. The areas in which this occurs were the central subjects of the curriculum, from exegesis and ecclesiastical law to grammar and on to arithmetic and the paschal

26 An example of ratio as ‘explanation’ is the lemma on which Sg. 40 a 7 is the gloss.
computus. Moreover, *dliged* is not the only Irish word to have undergone a semantic extension of this kind under the influence of Latin: *folud* ‘wealth’, ‘contractual consideration’, was adopted as the Irish counterpart to Latin *substantia*.\(^{27}\) Again *DIL* gives precedence to the Latin-influenced sense as against the primary meanings.\(^{28}\)

To conclude this investigation of the semantic development of *dliged* under the influence of Latin, it may be suggested how a dictionary entry, restricting itself to Old Irish examples, might be set out.

**Dliged** o. n. Abstract noun from *dligid*. [Semantic divisions are denoted by roman numerals; syntactic divisions by letters of the alphabet.]

I. Native usage: (1) senses related to the active construction *dligim ní duit* (*dit*), ‘I am entitled to something from you’: (i) entitlement, right; (ii) collectively, a body of rights; (iii) the thing or action to which someone is entitled.

(2) Senses related to the pass./impers. *dlegair* (*dligthir*) *ní duit*, ‘you owe something’. In Old Irish *dliged* is usually ‘right’ rather than ‘obligation’, but the reverse sense, ‘obligation’, is attested. Syntactically the norm is for *dliged* to govern a genitive noun or possessive pronoun denoting the person, persons or institution enjoying the right: hence the divisions are (a) dependent noun (subjective genitive); (b) possessive pronoun; (c) (rarer) *dliged* by itself with no dependent noun or pronoun. Further categories are (d) the adjectival use of the genitive *dligid*, and (e) the adverbial use of the dative *dlig(i)ud*.

(a) When *dliged* governs a noun in the genitive or a possessive pronoun, its meaning is influenced by whether the dependent noun or pronoun is (α) personal (incl. collective nouns for a group of persons), or (β) non-personal.

(α) A personal subjective genitive reflects a personal subject for *dligid*: (i) an individual’s entitlement or right: *a ndliged cach áe*, ‘the entitlement of each of them’, *CG* 319; *dliged sacairt i tempul is doib doberthe*, ‘a priest’s entitlement in the temple, it is to them that it used to be given’, Wb. 10 d 16; (ii) collective ‘rights’: *dliged tuaithe i n-eclais*, ‘the rights of the laity in respect of the Church’, *CIH* 529.20. (β) Much rarer is a non-personal subjective genitive: *Arindí dondichet a mmaici, a ddligiud altrama*, ‘Because he has come out of childhood, out of the requirements of fosterage’. A linking case is: *acht ni ro-raidsem i ndligud flatha*, ‘except for anything we have mentioned among the rights of lordship / the lord’, where *flaith* may be personal or non-personal.

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(b) With possessive pronoun: (i) *cia doratar biad ngaide do flaithe inna dliguid, is dilus do*, ‘although stolen food be given to a lord in respect of his entitlement, it is unactionable for him’ (no action lies against him), *CIH* 591.15–16 (*Berrad Airechta*, § 2); (ii) *dligid log neinech la diabul naithghina a dligid ocelna*, ‘he is entitled to his honour-price with a double restitution of his other rights’ (*CIH* 499.21 = *Cáin Aicillne*, § 56); (iii) *Mad in cele tathcuidrid(t)er fair ar dif[u]muid lais, is he sofoltach, dligid log n-einech la diabul n-aithghina a dligid ocelna*, ‘If it be the client who returns [the fief] to him on account of contempt on his (the client’s) part, and he (the lord) has fulfilled all his contractual obligations, he (the lord) is entitled to his honour-price together with double restitution of the other things to which he is entitled’ (*CIH* 499.20–1 = *Cáin Aicillne*, § 56).

(c) In the law of contract *dliged* is used by itself (*α*) of a contracting party’s rights in respect of fairness as opposed to the terms of the contract enforced by the *naidm* ‘binding surety’; this is the usage of *Berrad Airechta*, e.g. § 31 (*CIH* 593.14–16): *In tan immurgu arafinnathar in sochonn a saithiud* (*MS*: *suithiu*), *as suithiu naidm i suidhiu, air foriada-side forsa ndliged*; *is de ata*: *tresgata (.i. tregtaid) mac dliged*, ‘When, however, the person who is compos mentis knows that he is being cheated, the binding-surety prevails in that case, for it excludes “right”; for that reason there is a saying: “a surety pierces right”’. (*β*) In *Cóic Conara Fugill* (*R/E Recension*), §§ 8–9, however, *dliged* is the name of the second of the ‘five paths to judgement’ chosen by a plaintiff who is the creditor in a contract, whereas the third ‘path’, *cert*, is chosen by someone arguing that the terms of a contract were unfair. In (*α*), therefore, *dliged* is seen as the debtor’s right to a fair exchange, whereas in (*β*) it is the creditor’s right in virtue of the contract. (*γ*) In the lawtract *Din Techtugud* (*CIH* 210.12, 25, 26, 28) *dliged* is used alongside *Fénechas*, of the judicial settlement of a claim which follows upon the defendant’s decision to accept legal process; *dliged* here is the right as upheld by a judicial verdict.

(d) The genitive singular is used adjectivally: *arathar cona ógcórus dligid*, ‘a plough with its full rightful equipment’, *Críth Gablach*, ll. 409–10; *a fer dligid* ‘her rightful husband’, Wb. 3 c 7; *hillanamnas dligid*, ‘in a rightful sexual relationship’, *Mon. Tall.* § 86.

(e) The dat. sg. is used adverbially: *Atait secht mbeoscartha do flaitheib ocus a n-aicillnib, imis-fuaslaicet dligiud do coraib*, ‘There are seven separations on the part of lords and their base-clients during their lifetimes which rightfully release them from contracts’ (*CIH* 495.7 = *Cáin Aicillne*, § 48; cf. *Berrad Airechta*, §§ 55–6 = *CIH* 595.31, 36).

(f) Probably from (*α*), (*β*) and (*γ*) is derived the use of *dliged* to mean ‘a state to which one is entitled’, ‘rightful state or condition’: *arna dich cách assa dligud i n-adaltras tri lathar demuin et tri bar neph-congabhetiti*, ‘lest everyone should depart from his rightful condition
into adultery through a plan of the Devil and through your incontinence’, Wb. 9 d 24.

(2) **Dliged** ‘debt, obligation’: *dligetha* gl. *debita*, Wb. 6 a 23.

II. Usage influenced by Latin:

(a) **dliged** = *ratio*:

(i) ‘calculation’: *amal as ndliged fir* *(‘indubitata ratio’) bís i n-arim do neuch atarimi*, ‘as it is a true calculation that is in counting by the person who counts them’ *(‘numerorum’)*, Ml. 111 c 17.

(ii) ‘argument’: *n-armtar co ndegdligedaib dia frihtuidecht*, ‘that they are armed with good arguments to oppose them’ Mi. 16 b 6; *iss ed a ndliged forthet usus*, ‘this is the argument *(sc. Velius Celer’s from declension and the length of the i) which usus supports’, Sg. 187 b 4.

(iii) ‘reason’: *dliged buithe in boicht fo mam int sommai — ní reltar son do neuch naichidfetar*, ‘this is the reason why the poor man is under the yoke of the rich man — that is not explained to anyone who does not know it’, Mi. 27 d 7.

(iv) ‘grammatical process’, ‘mode or method of forming derived forms’: *is indib nammá atá a ndliged cruthaigeo geniten-so*, ‘it is only in them *(sc. cpds. of caput, e.g biceps) that there exists this method of forming the genitive’, Sg. 113 b 3; *iar ndligud arside, iarsin dligud dano fil hindiu*, ‘according to an ancient process *(sc. the ratio analogiae) [and] according to the process current today’ *(sc. recta proportio)*, Sg. 178 a 3.

(v) ‘rational order’, ‘intelligible structure’: *nifil chosmailius fir do neuch asber nad mbed dliged remdeicsen dæ du doinib sech remideci dia dunab annandaib amlabrib*, ‘there is not a semblance of truth on the part of the person who says that there is no divine providential order for men, for God also provides for the dumb animals’, Mi. 55 d 25. The principal link between I and II (a) is probably that between I (a) (β) and II (a) (v) as shown by the reverse calque (Latin on Irish) in Wb. 9 d 20, where *ex ratione matrimonii* is equivalent to a *dliged lánamnaso*.

(b) **dliged** = *sententia* or *dictum* (sometimes ‘correct statement’ in contrast with *toimitiu* ‘wrong opinion’): *duber fu dí a ndliged-sa isind salm*, ‘he gives this sentence twice in the psalm’, glossing *iteratur sententia*, Mi. 77 b 11.

The link between I and II (b) may lie in sentences such as *Ar ata i ndliged na Feine buachail oc cach cethrai fri de*, ‘For it is part of the requirements of the Irish that a herdsman be with all livestock by day’, *CIH* 72.10–11. **Dliged** is here a collective meaning ‘the body of rights’; among these rights is *buachail oc cach cethrai fri de*, supported by the maxim ‘cond bo buachaill i mbansoilsi’. From a *sententia* being among the collective *dliged* of the Féni, the *sententia* might come to be a singular *dliged* of the Féni. Hence, *dliged* as *sententia* or *dictum* probably arose in a context that was both exegetical and legal, namely the use of scripture as a source of law.
(c) dliged = intellectus: adrimfem UGINS doaidlibem cech n-oín dliged fil in psalmis, ‘we shall enumerate and deal with every meaning that is in the psalms’, Ml. 14 d 5. The explanation of this sense of dliged is uncertain. It may have arisen from dliged = sententia, since the latter can have the sense of ‘meaning’. If it arose from dliged = ratio, the likeliest candidate is ratio in the sense of ‘intelligible order’. If it arose from native usage, and thus independently of II (a) and (b), the likeliest starting-point is dliged ‘requirement’, passing via ‘implication’ (perhaps attested in Ml. 18 c 11) to ‘meaning’.

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